THE VOID ORDER AND THE DUTY TO OBEY*
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T IS familiar law that the duty of a litigant to obey a temporary restraining order or a temporary injunction does not always depend
upon the validity of the court's command. Even though the order or
injunction may ultimately be held erroneous by the courts, the order or
injunction may be entitled to obedience until it is reversed or set aside
on appeal, and disobedience of its provisions in the interim may be punr
ished in a proceeding for criminal contempt.
In what circumstances does an invalid order or temporary injunction
issued by a federal court possess this kind of vitality pendente lite?2 Discussion of this question may well begin by reference to the general principle that courts and commentators have sometimes said is applicable.
This principle distinguishes between restraining orders and injunctions
that are void because made without jurisdiction, on the one hand, and
orders and injunctions that are merely improvident, irregular, or erroneous, on the other. If the court issuing the restraining order or injunction
does not have jurisdiction, the order or injunction is said to be void, and
to be a nullity; it may be disregarded with impunity. 3 But if the court has
jurisdiction over the persons of the litigants and of the subject matter of
the litigation, the restraining order or injunction, no matter how improvident or erroneous it may be, must be obeyed until reversed on appeal, and
* The substance of this article was presented as a paper read before the Equity section of
the Association of American Law Schools in Chicago, December 1947.
t Member of the District of Columbia and New York Bars.
xBecause a proceeding for civil contempt is remedial in its nature there can be no liability
for civil contempt if the injunction violated is ultimately held to have been erroneously issued.
United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 295 (1947); Worden v. Searls, 121
U.S. 14 (1887); Salvage Process Corp. v. Acme Tank Cleaning Process Corp., 86 F. 2d 727
(C.C.A. 2d, 1936); cf. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (191).
2 The discussion in this article is confined to the decisions of the federal courts. The few
decisions by state courts which are cited are merely illustrative of certain points.
3 In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 220 (i888); In re Ayres, 123 U.S. 443, 485-86 (1887); Ex
parte Fisk, 113 U.S. 713, 718 (I885); Ex parte Rowland, 1o4 U.S. 604, 612 (i88i); see Ex
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 143 (i9o8); 2 High, Injunctions § 1425 ( 4 th ed., 9os); Moskovitz,
Contempt of Injunctions, Civil and Criminal, 43 Col. L. Rev. 780, 782 (I943); Cook, The
Powers of a Court of Equity, 15 Col. L. Rev. io6-7 (1915); Liability of Lawyer for Advising
Disobedience, 39 Col. L. Rev. 433-47 (i939). For a discussion of the distinction in terms of
judgments generally, see Black, Law of Judgments §§ 170, 2JP, 278 (2d ed., i9o2).
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the litigant who disobeys the order may be punished for contempt. 4 The
federal courts that have stated this principle have done so without reference to the language of Section 268 of the Judicial Code, the statutory
source of the power of the federal courts to punish for contempt. Since
1831 that statute has provided that the authority of the federal courts to
punish those who disobey or resist orders of the courts shall extend only to
disobedience or resistance "to any lawful writ, process, order, rule decree
or command." To reconcile the principle with the statute, it is necessary
to conclude that a restraining order or an injunction, even though ultimately held invalid, is nevertheless "lawful" within the meaning of the
statutory language until reversed, provided that the order or the injunction has been issued by a court that has jurisdiction of the person and of
the subject matter.'
Because this principle tests the duty to obey by a reference to the question of whether the court issuing the command has jurisdiction, the application of the principle to a particular situation will necessarily require a
decision of that question. The question of whether a court has jurisdiction is one that has arisen in the federal courts in a variety of cases; and
the variations in the cases presenting the question have frequently led
to differences both in the purposes and in the consequences of the decisions. Under these circumstances, it is hardly surprising to find that "jurisdiction" is a word to which the courts have given various shades of meaning.7 Since any attempt to discuss all aspects of the concept of jurisdiction would extend this article beyond reasonable limits, questions relating to jurisdiction over the person will be put aside and the discussion confined to the concept of jurisdiction of the subject matter.
A court is said to have jurisdiction of the subject matter of a particular
controversy if the court has authority to hear and decide causes of a class
4 Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 18i, I8-o (1922); Elliot v. Peirsol, i Pet. (U.S.) 328 (1828);
Western Fruit Growers v. Gotfried, 136 F. 2d 98, ioo (C.C.A. 9 th, 1943); Locke v. United
States, 75 F. 2d 157, z59 (C.C.A. 5th, 1935); Brougham v. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co.,
2o5 Fed. 857 (C.C.A. 2d, 1913). For an early discussion of the distinction between injunctions
which are merely erroneous and those which are void for lack of jurisdiction, see People ex rel.
Davis v. Sturtevant, 9 N.Y. 263 (1853).
s36 stat. 1163 (IgI), 28 U.S.C.A. § 385 (1928).
6See the comment of Justice Rutledge, dissenting in United States v. United Mine Workers,
330 U.S. 258, 361 (947).
7 For comment on the different meanings which are sometimes given to the word "jurisdiction," particularly as applied to the subject matter of litigation, see Stoll v. Gottlieb,
305 U.S. i65, 176 (1938); In re Labor Board, 304 U.S. 468, 494 (1938); Massachusetts State
Grange v. Benton, 272 U.S. 525, 528 (1926); Binderup v. Path6 Exchange, 263 U.S. 291, 305
(1923); Illinois Central R. Co. v. Adams, i8o U.S. 28, 38 (igoi); Moran v. Moran, 16o F. 2d
925, 926-27 (App. D.C., 1947); In re Stuart, 114 F. 2d 825, 833 (App. D.C., 194o); Amey v.
Colebrook Guaranty Savings Bank, 92 F. 2d 62, 63 (C.C.A. 2d, 1937).
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to which the particular controversy belongs.8 In defining jurisdiction of
the subject matter in these terms, the courts have emphasized that the
jurisdiction of a court depends upon its right to decide the case and not
upon the merits of its decision. 9
The basic authority of the federal courts to hear and to decide controversies comes from the provisions of the Constitution that define the
judicial power.' 0 Within the limits fixed by the constitutional provisions,
the jurisdiction of the federal courts has been further limited and defined
by acts of Congress. In the exercise of its constitutional powers Congress
has established the inferior federal courts, defined their territorial jurisdiction, and specified the classes or kinds of controversies that these inferior
courts are authorized to decide."r In some instances Congress has directed
that only inferior federal courts of a particular composition may decide
particular kinds of controversies." Under the Constitution, Congress also
has the authority to enact regulations governing the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court, and in the exercise of this authority it has specified
the categories of controversies in which that appellate power may be exercised. The constitutional provisions and the statutes mentioned in this
paragraph impose limitations upon the courts that are truly jurisdictional in character; that is to say, they are limitations upon the power of the
courts to decide particular kinds of controversies.
But in addition to the statutes creating the inferior federal courts and
defining the kinds of controversies that those courts are authorized to decide, there are numerous other statutes that control or limit in one way
or another the conduct of the lower federal courts in deciding cases. These
statutes differ widely in their scope, their language, and their purpose. In
most instances the limitations imposed by these statutes are not truly ju8 See Cooper v. Reynolds, io Wall. (U.S.) 308, 316 (x870); Grignon's Lessee v. Astor, 2
How. (U.S.) 319 (i844); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. (U.S.) 657 (1838); Brougham
v. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co., 2o5 Fed. 857, 86o (C.C.A. 2d, 1913); Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N.Y.
217, 229 (1878); People ex tel. Davis v. Sturtevant, 9 N.Y. 263 (1853).
9Ex parte Watkins, 7 Pet. (U.S.) 568, 572 (1833); Brougham v. Oceanic Steam Navigation
Co., 2o5 Fed. 857, 86o (C.C.A. 2d, 1913); United States v. Ass'n of American Railroads,
4 F.R.D. 5io, 517-i8 (Neb., 1945); Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N.Y. 217, 229 (1878); People ex tel.
Davis v. Sturtevant, 9 N.Y. 263 (1853). 10 U.S. Const. Art. mI; U.S. Const. Amend. ii.
11Section

24

of the judicial Code, 36 Stat. ogI (I9II), 28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (1927), is a familiar

example of a statute which defines controversies that the lower federal courts are authorized
to decide.
IIFor example, 38 Stat. 220 (1913),
28 U.S.C.A. § 47 (X927), provides that any suit to
suspend or set aside an order of the Interestate Commerce Commission must be heard and
decided by a specially convened District Court composed of three judges, "of whom at least
one shall be a Circuit Judge." See also the Act of August 24, 1937, 50 Stat. 752 (i937), 28
U.S.C.A. § 38oa (Supp., 1947).
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risdictional in character; the limitations do not deprive the courts of authority to decide the subject matter of particular controversies, but prescribe a rule of conduct that the courts are directed to follow in deciding
controversies that fall within their jurisdiction. To use the language of Mr.
Justice Holmes in Burnet v. Desmornes,"3 these statutes do not "affect the
power of the court," but merely "fix the law by which the court should decide." This distinction between statutory limitations that are truly jurisdictional and those that are not is clear enough in the abstract, but it is
not always easy to decide into which category a particular limitation
should fall.
In the earlier cases in which the federal courts considered whether an order was void and therefore need not be obeyed, the courts adopted this distinction between truly jurisdictional limitations of judicial authority and
limitations that control the conduct of a court but do not define its jurisdiction. But although the courts explained their decisions in terms of the
distinction, an examination of their decisions suggests that whatever merit
this distinction may have in the abstract, it is not always satisfactory in
practice. It is apparent that to preserve the distinction and at the same
time to achieve results thought to be equitable, courts have sometimes
found it necessary to give the concept of jurisdiction of subject matter a
meaning inconsistent with the definition that the same courts have
framed at other times and for other purposes.
Discussion of these decisions may well begin with two cases in which the
Supreme Court held judicial orders void because of infirmities that were
truly jurisdictional. In the first of these cases, In re Ayers, 4 a bill in equity
was filed in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District
of Virginia by persons who had bought tax receivable coupons cut from
bonds of the State of Virginia. The purpose of the bill was to enjoin Ayers,
who was Attorney General of Virginia, and certain other State officers,
from prosecuting suits in the name of the State against delinquent taxpayers who tendered the tax receivable coupons in payment of taxes. The
Circuit Court issued a restraining order that prohibited the defendants
from instituting such proceedings. After the defendants violated the ors
der, Ayers was prosecuted and convicted of contempt.
X3226

U.S.

145, 147 (191,2).

U.S. 443 (X887).
Is In Carter v. United States, 135 F. 2d 858, 861 (C.C.A. 5 th, 1943), it was suggested
that the proceeding in In re Ayers was for civil contempt. It is difficult to accept this suggestion. Ayers was fined $Soo for his contempt and committed to the custody of the marshal
until he paid the fine and purged himself of the contempt by dismissing the proceedings in the
state court which was alleged to have constituted the contempt. The fine was imposed in
absolute terms and appears to have been punitive in character. 123 U.S. 443, 457 (1887).
'4 123
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The Supreme Court held that the suit was, in fact, a suit against the
State and therefore within the scope of the Eleventh Amendment, so that
the lower court had lacked jurisdiction. As a result, the restraining order
issued by the lower court was declared a nullity, and Ayerswas ordered released on a writ of habeas corpus. It is difficult to quarrel with the view
that the limitations imposed by the Eleventh Amendment are jurisdictional in character.,6 Curiously enough, however, for other purposes the
Supreme Court has refused to regard problems arising under the Eleventh
Amendment as jurisdictional questions. For example, in Illinois Central
Railroad Company v. Adams,1 the Court dealt with a problem of pleading
and practice" by stating, "The question whether this is a suit against the
State within the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution... is also one
which we think belongs to the merits rather than to the jurisdiction."
In re Burrus 9 furnishes another example of an order correctly held void
because made by a court having no jurisdiction of the subject matter. In
that case the Supreme Court decided that in the absence of any of the
statutory grounds of federal jurisdiction, a United States district court
had no jurisdiction of a suit brought to obtain the custody of a child. Accordingly, an order awarding custody of a child, issued by a district court
in such a suit, was held void, and the lower court was declared powerless
°
to punish disobedience of the order in criminal contempt proceedings.2
In both the Ayers and Burrus cases the infirmities that the Supreme
Court regarded as making the orders void were truly jurisdictional in character. But in other cases in which the Supreme Court has been called upon
to decide whether an erroneous order was void the Court seems to have extended the concept of jurisdiction of the subject matter into areas where
the propriety of its application is open to question.
' 6 In Ex parte Young, 209 U.S.

123, 142, 149 (19o8), the Supreme Court regarded the application of the Eleventh Amendment as raising a jurisdictional question.
'7 18o U.S. 28, 37 (,901).
18 The particular point under consideration in this case was whether the question of the
application of the Eleventh Amendment could properly be raised by a motion to dismiss.
The Court held that such a motion was not the proper way to raise the defense, at least in a
case where the suit was brought against an individual and not against the state eo nomine.
The Supreme Court has also held that the immunity from suit conferred upon a state by the
Eleventh Amendment may be waived by the state. Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.,
2oo U.S. 273 (i9o6); Clark v. Barnard, io8 U.S. 436, 447 (1883). Yet in other contexts the
Supreme Court has said that "the lack of jurisdiction of a federal court touching the subject
matter of the litigation cannot be waived by the parties... ." United States v. Corrick, 298
U.S. 435, 440 (1936).
19136 U.S. 586 (r89o).
20 The petitioner had been committed to jail for contempt of the district court order
awarding custody of the child and had petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas
corpus.
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In Ex parte Fisk,21 one illustration of this tendency on the part of the
Court, Fisk had been sued for fraud in a court of the State of New York.
The New York court, acting pursuant to the provisions of the New York
Code of Civil Procedure, had ordered Fisk to permit his testimony and
deposition to be taken by the party before trial. Before the examination
was completed, Fisk removed the case to the Circuit Court of the United
States. That court issued an order requiring Fisk to appear and to continue the examination which had been started in the state court. Fisk refused. He was held in contempt, fined $500, and committed to the custody
of the marshal until the fine was paid.22 Fisk thereupon applied to the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus.
The Supreme Court, after reviewing the provisions of Section 86i of
the revised statutes23 and certain related provisions, concluded that the
circuit court did not have the authority under the statutes to order the
taking of the defendant's deposition before trial.24 The Court therefore
concluded that the order of the circuit court was made without jurisdiction and was void, so that Fisk should be released from his commitment.
In this case there was no question of jurisdiction over the person of
Fisk and no question of the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the lawsuit. Indeed, Fisk's removal of the case to the federal court
constituted an assertion that the court did have jurisdiction of the subject
matter. The point really decided by the Supreme Court was that the circuit court had no authority under the statutes to issue the particular
order that Fisk had violated. It seems difficult to escape the conclusion
that this point did not touch the power of the circuit court over Fisk's person or its authority to hear the case, but related only to the circuit court's
authority to issue a particular kind of interlocutory order.
It is true that the circuit court had erroneously construed the applicable
statute and that it had attempted to issue an order that the statutes did
not empower it to make. In this sense the court's action was unauthorized. In addition it might be said that the court in this case had not merely erroneously issued an order of a kind that it was authorized to make,
but on the contrary that this particular order belonged in a category of
113 U.S. 7M3 (1885).
There is no discussion of the point in the case, but it would appear that this was a proceeding for criminal contempt.
23Rev. Stat. § 861 (1878), 28 U.S.C.A. § 635 (1928).
24 Section 86i provided that the mode of proof in the trial of actions at common law should
be by oral testimony and examination of witnesses in open court except as otherwise provided.
The Supreme Court in its opinion examined the exceptions to this provision and concluded
that none of them applied to the case at bar.
r
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orders entirely outside the authority of the court. Even when the point is
stated in this way, however, it hardly seems appropriate to regard the
lower court's error as jurisdictional. The test of jurisdiction over the
subject matter is whether the court can decide the case at all and not
whether the court has authority to issue a particular kind of order in the
course of deciding the case. It has already been pointed out that statutes
place many restrictions upon the action that a federal court may take in
deciding the cases to which its authority extends. No serious contention
can be made that in every instance in which the court erroneously construes those statutes, its mistake goes to the question of jurisdiction.25
In Ex parte Rowland,26 the order of a lower federal court, reviewed by
the Supreme Court, similarly appears to have been erroneous but not in
excess of jurisdiction in the strict sense. There a petition for a writ of habeas corpus had been brought to secure the discharge of state officials who
had been convicted of contempt for failing to comply with a writ of mandamus issued by a lower federal court. The Supreme Court held that the
writ of mandamus had been improperly issued because it attempted to
compel the officers against whom it was directed to cause a tax to be collected when it was not their legal duty to collect the tax. On that basis, the
Court concluded that the order committing the petitioners was void and a
nullity and ordered them released. The case illustrates the familiar principle that a writ of mandamus can be issued directly only against a person
whose duty it is to do the thing that the parties seek to have done. Thus
the situation was one in which the lower court had erred as to the scope
of the remedy of mandamus but hardly one in which the court had
acted in excess of its jurisdiction. It should be noted that the writ of mandamus was sought in this case as ancillary to a judgment secured in the
lower federal court in a case in which that court clearly had jurisdiction.27
25For example, the Act of October 15, 1914, 38 Stat. 738 (1914), 28 U.S.C.A. § 383 (1928),
provides that every injunction or restraining order shall set forth the reasons for its issuance.
The Supreme Court has held that disregard of this requirement does not make an interlocutory
order void. Lawrence v. St. L.-S.F. Ry. Co., 274 U.S. 588, 592 (1927). Section 265 of the
Judicial Code, 36 Stat. 1162 (i911), 28 U.S.C.A. § 379 (i928), provides that except in bankruptcy cases the writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the United States
to stay proceedings in any court of a state. The Supreme Court has said of this statute in
Smith v. Apple, 264 U.S. 274, 278-79 (1924): "It is not a jurisdictional statute. It neither confers jurisdiction upon the district courts nor takes away the jurisdiction otherwise specifically
conferred upon them by the federal statutes. It merely limits their general equity powers in
respect to the granting of a particular form of equitable relief; that is, it prevents them from
granting relief by way of injunction in the cases included within its inhibitions. In short, it
goes merely to the question of equity in the particular bill." See also Woodmen of the World v.
O'Neill, 266 U.S. 292, 298 (1924).
26io4 U.S. 604 (i88I).
27The contempt involved in the case was apparently a civil contempt, and the soundness
of the Supreme Court's decision may be defended on that ground. Compare Beauchamp v.
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The tendency of the Supreme Court in the past to expand the concept
of jurisdiction when necessary to excuse litigants from the duty of
obeying an erroneous order was also apparent in In re Sawyer.2' In
that case the Supreme Court held that a lower federal court lacked jurisdiction to entertain a bill in equity to restrain the mayor and certain
members of the city council of Lincoln, Nebraska from removing a police
judge of the city on charges of malfeasance. The Supreme Court concluded
that this absence of jurisdiction rendered the lower court's temporary restraining order void. Consequently, the defendants, who had been convicted of contempt for having violated the restraining order, were discharged upon a writ of habeas corpus.
The jurisdiction of the lower federal court had been invoked on the
ground that the defendants' activities violated rights of the plaintiff secured to him by the Constitution of the United States. But the Supreme
Court did not hold that the lower court lacked jurisdiction because no
substantial constitutional question was involved. Instead, the Court based
its conclusion as to the lower court's absence of authority to entertain the
litigation primarily on the premise that a court of equity has no jurisdiction over the appointment or removal of public officers, the power to determine title to a public office resting exclusively in the courts of law.29 In
other words, the Supreme Court decided that the cause of action asserted
in the lower court was not the type of suit of which the courts of equity
historically took cognizance; that is to say, that there was a lack of
"equity jurisdiction."
The question raised by the decision in In re Sawyer is whether "equity
jurisdiction" should be regarded as the kind of jurisdiction whose absence
makes an order void. Originally the term "equity jurisdiction" doubtless
referred to the category of controversies that a court of equity was auUnited States, 76 F. 2d 663 (C.C.A. 9th, 1935), where the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit (Judge Wilbur dissenting) held that a person alleged to have disobeyed an order made
by a referee in bankruptcy could not be punished for criminal contempt because the order
was void. The referee's order was doubtless erroneous, but this too seems to have been a case
in which the lower court made an error in its interpretation of the substantive law and not a
case in which the court acted in excess of its jurisdiction.

(1888).
The Court also considered x) whether the proceedings of the defendants in the case
could be regarded as criminal or quasi-criminal in character and 2) whether the defendants'
proceedings were to be considered as proceedings in a state court. It concluded that in either
2S 124 U.S. 200, 212, 220
29

event the lower court had no jurisdiction because z) a court of equity has no authority to
enjoin the prosecution or the punishment of crimes, and 2) the Act of March 2, 1793, 1 Stat.
335 (1793), provided that no injunction should be issued by any court of the United States
to stay proceedings in any state court except when authorized by a bankruptcy statute. As to
the latter point, compare Smith v. Apple, 264 U.S. 274 (1924).

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

thorized to decide. So long as the principles of equity were administered
by separate courts, questions of equity jurisdiction were jurisdictional
questions in the strict sense; if the cause of action was not of a kind that
fell within the province of the chancellor, a court of equity had no power
to decide the cause. But the abolition of the distinction between courts of
law and courts of equity and the establishment of a single system of
courts authorized to administer both the principles of law and the principles of equity tended to give the term "equity jurisdiction" a somewhat
different meaning.30 In the case of a single court authorized to apply the
principles of both law and equity, the statement that there is lack of "equity jurisdiction" does not necessarily mean that the court lacks power to
adjudicate the controversy. The statement is usually intended to mean
merely that under the historic principles of equity the plaintiff is not entitied to the relief he seeks. Thus, today the concept of equity jurisdiction
is one that relates rather to the question of the merits of a controversy
than to the basic power of the court to decide the case. 3
The Supreme Court has made a distinction between questions that
affect the power or authority of the federal courts, as federal courts, to
decide controversies, on the one hand, and questions of equity jurisdiction, on the other, and has said that questions in the latter category are
not truly jurisdictional questions at all. Thus, in commenting on the pro30 Compare Maitland's comment to the effect that after the judicature Acts of 1873 and
1875 it was no longer possible to regard equity as a body of rules that was administered by
any single court. Maitland, Equity i, 15-16, 20-2X (2d ed., 1936).
31 See Massachusetts State Grange v. Benton, 272 U.S. 525, 528 (1926), where justice
Holmes, speaking for the Court, said: "Courts sometimes say that there is no jurisdiction
in equity when they mean only that equity ought not to give the relief asked. In a strict sense
the Court in this case had jurisdiction. It had power to grant an injunction, and if it had granted one its decree, although wrong, would not have been void. But upon the merits we think it
too plain to need argument that to grant an injunction upon the allegations of this bill would
be to fly in the face of the rule which, as we have said, we think should be very strictly observed." The "rule" referred to by Justice Holmes was the principle that "no injunction ought
to issue against officers of a State clothed with authority to enforce the law in question, unless
in a case reasonably free from doubt and when necessary to prevent great and irreparable
injury."
In this regard, compare Pomeroy, Equity §§ 129, 131 (5 th ed., 194); see also Cook,
The Powers of a Court of Equity, x5 Col. L. Rev. io6-7 (i915): "In its strict and proper
sense 'jurisdiction' so far as it relates to courts, means power to take valid action which will
be binding on the parties until set aside or reversed by some competent tribunal. In the equity
cases, however, in many cases all that is meant by the statement 'that equity has no jurisdiction' in a given case, is that equitable relief will not be given by courts of equity, though,
if it were given, the decree entered, even if erroneous, would be binding on the parties until
some competent tribunal took action to alter it in some way. The difference is an important
one for the reason that, if the court had no jurisdiction, i.e., power to make the alleged decree,
there is no decree to which any attention need be paid." This passage seems to involve circuity of definition. Cook defines jurisdiction by reference to whether the order made is binding on the parties until reversed or set aside. But he also appears to say that the test of whether
the order is binding is whether it is made in the exercise of jurisdiction.
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visions of Section 24(I) of the Judicial Code,32 which provides that in
certain circumstances district courts shall have jurisdiction of suits of
a civil nature in equity, Chief Justice Stone said in Atlas Life Insurance

Company v. W. I. Southern, Incorporated:
The "jurisdiction" thus conferred on the federal courts to entertain suits in equity is
an authority to administer in equity suits the principles of the system of judicial
remedies which had been devised and was being administered by the English court
of chancery at the time of the separation of the two countries.... This clause of the
statute does not define the jurisdiction of the district courts as federal courts, in the
sense of their power and authority to hear and decide, but prescribes the body of
doctrine which is to guide their decisions and enable them to determine whether in any
given instance a suit of which a district court had jurisdiction as a federal court is an
appropriate one for the exercise of the extraordinary powers of a court of equity.33

Again he asserted in Douglas v. Jeanetlte 4 that "want of equity jurisdiction" does not go to the power of the court to decide. In a still earlier case,
Mellen v. Moline Iron Works,35 the Court, in dealing with the question of
collateral attack and res judicata, declared that an adjudication that a
particular case is of equitable cognizance "is not void even if erroneous."
All these statements were made in cases in which the Court was not

considering whether an order issued by a lower court that lacked equity
jurisdiction was void and need not be obeyed pendente lite.36 For that
32

54 Stat. 143 (1940), 28 U.S.C.A. § 41(1) (Supp., 1947).

U.S. 563, 568 (1939).
34319 U.S. 157, 62 (I943).
131 U.S. 352, 367 (1889); see also Di Giovanni v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 296 U.S. 64, 69
(i935); Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176, x8i (1935); Smith v. Apple, 264 U.S. 274,
33 306
3s

278 (1924).
36 For example, in Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W. I. Southern, Inc., 306 U.S. 563 (1939), a
Circuit Court of Appeals had certified questions to the Supreme Court under Section 239
the Judicial Code, 43 Stat. 938 (1925), 28 U.S.C.A. § 346 (1928). The principal issue in the
case was whether an insurance company could bring a suit in equity in a federal court for
cancellation of insurance policies on the ground of fraud. The case turned ultimately on the
question of whether an adequate remedy existed at law in the state courts.

In Douglas v. Jeannette, 3x9 U.S. 157 (i943), the problem was whether the plaintiffs,

Jehovah's Witnesses, could enjoin threatened criminal prosecution for violation of a city
ordinance.
In Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176, 181 (i935), the Supreme Court held that a
suit to liquidate an insolvent building and loan association, there being the requisite allegations of diversity of citizenship and jurisdictional amount, was within the jurisdiction of the
federal district court. The Court ruled that whether the suit should have been brought by a
shareholder of the insolvent corporation rather than a judgment creditor and whether, under
state law, the shareholder had creditor status were questions going to the propriety of the
action of a court of equity and not to its jurisdiction.
Compare Verner v. Great Northern Ry., 209 U.S. 24 (i9o8), and Illinois Central R. Co.,
i8o U.S. 28 (19ox) (the issue involved was whether the objection that the plaintiff had not
complied with Equity Rule 94 was one going to the jurisdiction of the lower federal court);
Blythe v. Hinckley, 173 U.S. 501 (i899) (problem of whether a lower court ruling on the
question of the complainant's plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law was a decision on a
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reason it may be argued that no matter how explicit the Court's statements may have been, they are not controlling or even persuasive upon the point that is now under discussion. But it is difficult to embrace a
conclusion that requires us to give the concept of equity jurisdiction one
meaning in one context and quite a different meaning in another; certainly

in a discussion of the principle that is to apply to the question whether a
litigant is required to obey an invalid restraining order pendente lite we
are not required to disregard entirely the meaning which the Supreme
Court has given to the term "equity jurisdiction" in the cases cited in the
preceding paragraph.
The attitude of the federal courts toward questions of equity jurisdiction is further illustrated by reference to the familiar doctrine that a court
of equity will not entertain a suit if the plaintiff has a plain and adequate
remedy at law. It seems clear that historically this principle imposed a
limitation upon the Court of Chancery that was truly jurisdictional in
character; if an adequate remedy existed at law, the court had no authority to hear the case and the suitor was remitted to the courts that had
jurisdiction37 The principle is embodied in Section 267 of the Judicial
Code, 35 which explicitly prohibits any court of the United States from entertaining a suit in equity in any case where a plain, adequate, and complete remedy may be had at law. The Supreme Court has consistently
held that this section does not affect the jurisdiction of the federal courts
in the sense of affecting their power to decide.3 9
Indeed, it is interesting to note that the opinion of the majority of the
Court in In re Sawyer recognized that the fact that the plaintiff had an
adequate remedy at law would not deprive a court of equity of jurisdiction
so as to make its order void. In describing the limits of its holding, the
Court said:
Neither do we say that, in a case belonging to a class or subject which is within the
jurisdiction both of courts of equity and of courts of law, a mistake of a court of equity,
jurisdictional questin which could be reviewed by direct appeal to the Supreme Court under
the provision of the Judicial Code permitting such appeal in any case in which jurisdiction was
in issue); Smith v. McKay, 16i U.S. 355 (1896).
37 See i Spence, The Equitable Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery 419 (1846): "It was a
principle, that if the matter were properly cognizable, and relievable in any established court of
ordinary jurisdiction, and no assistance was required from the court to effectuate a fair trial, the
parties should be dismissed from the Court of Chancery to a Court of Common Law, or other
court of competent jurisdiction...."
38 1

Stat.

82 (1789), 28

U.S.C.A. § 384

(1928).

39 Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W. I. Southern, Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 570 (1939); Di Giovanni v.
Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 296 U.S. 64, 69 (1935); Henriette Mills v. Rutherford County, 281
U.S. 121, 128 (i93o); cf. Amis v. Meyers, x6 How. (U.S.) 492 (1853).
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in deciding that in the particular matter before it there could be no full, adequate
and complete remedy at law, will render its decree absolutely void.40

This statement, although negative in form, seems to suggest that the
Court would have reached an opposite conclusion as to the jurisdiction
of the lower court if the only question had been whether there was a full,
adequate, and complete remedy at law. Thus the Court's dictum implies
the curious conclusion that lack of equity jurisdiction on one ground
makes a decree absolutely void, and lack of equity jurisdiction on another
ground, equally historic and well recognized in character, does not have
that effect. The anomaly disclosed by this analysis is particularly striking
in view of the fact that the Court's decision in In re Sawyer that the jurisdiction of a court of equity did not extend to controversies involving appointments" to or removals from public offices rested at least in part
on the ground that "[the jurisdiction to determine the title to a public office belongs exclusively to the courts of law, and is exercised either
by certiorari,error or appeal, or by mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto,
or information in the nature of a writ of quo warranto,according to the circumstances of the case, and the mode of procedure established by the common law or by statute."'' 4 This statement suggests that the adequacy of
the available legal remedies was one reason that courts of equity did not
take cognizance of cases involving the title to public office.
In the light of the Supreme Court's declarations in regard to equity
jurisdiction in other connections, it seems difficult to escape the conclusion
reached by Justice Harlan in his dissent that the Court erred in holding in
In re Sawyer that lack of equity jurisdiction made the temporary restraining order void. 42
40In

re Sawyer,

124 U.S. 200, 221 (1888).

4' Ibid., at 212.
42Justice Harlan argued: "Whether the Circuit Court, sitting in equity, could properly
grant to the plaintiff the relief asked is not a question of jurisdiction within the rule that
orders, judgments, or decrees are void, where the court, which passed them, was without jurisdiction. It is rather a question as to the exercise of jurisdiction." Ibid., at 224. In his dissenting

opinion in United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 355-56 n.

19,

357 (1947),

Justice Rutledge suggested that Justice Harlan had later "receded from" or "retracted"
the views he had expressed in In re Sawyer. The passage in Justice Harlan's dissent in Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 169 (i9o8), to which Justice Rutledge refers does not seem to be directed
to the problem of whether lack of equity jurisdiction makes a temporary injunction void.
Justice Harlan's discussion in Ex parte Young centered on whether the suit was one against the
state within the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment. Therefore, the prior dissenting opinions
to which he referred in the Young case must have been opinions in which the latter question
and not that of the lack of equity jurisdiction was before the Court. Doubtless one of the dissenting opinions which Justice Harlan had in mind was his statement in In re Ayers, 123 U.S.
443, 5io-i6 (1887). There he had dissented on the ground that the suit was not one against
the state under the Eleventh Amendment.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Carter v. United States, 135 F. 2d 858,
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It may be useful to pause at this point to inquire whether there is any
explanation for the Supreme Court's willingness in such cases as Ex
parte Fisk and In re Sawyer to regard infirmities as jurisdictional when
the better view would seem to have been that although the orders involved
were erroneous, they were not void. It has been suggested that the Court's
decisions in these cases were influenced by the fact that when the cases
were decided a person convicted of criminal contempt could obtain appellate review only by the writ of habeas corpus. 43 It was well settled at
the time of these decisions that the writ of habeas corpus would not be
used as a writ of error to review the decisions of lower courts on the merits,
but that it would be used only to reach those exercises of authority which
were void because in excess of jurisdiction. 44 Consequently, if the Court
wished to give the petitioner, in such a case as Ex parte Fisk or In re Sawyer, any relief whatever, the Court was forced to take the position that the
invalidity of the order that had been disobeyed was jurisdictional in character. It is significant that Justice Miller expressly referred to this fact at
the very beginning of the Court's opinion in Ex parte Fisk. Equally persuasive is the possibility that in the latter case the Court was moved in
part by the belief that if Fisk obeyed the erroneous order, his legal interests would be substantially and irrevocably injured; for that reason, the
Court may have believed that Fisk was entitled to relief from so patently
erroneous an order as the one that the lower court had made.
If there is any merit in the view that these considerations may have influenced the decisions of the Supreme Court, that view suggests that the
861 (C.C.A. 5th, 1943), took the view that In re Sawyer had been erroneously decided; see
also 5i Harv. L. Rev. 747 (1938), noting Reid v. Independent Union of AllWorkers, 20o Minn.
599, 275 N.W. 300 (1937). But compare the comment of Cook, op. cit. supra note 3, who seems
to regard the decision as a true illustration of the difference between lack of primary jurisdiction and equity jurisdiction.
43In Carter v. United States, 135 F. 2d 858, 861 (C.C.A. 5 th, 1943), this suggestion was
made with particular reference to the decision in Ex parte Fisk.
Dissenting in Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, i85-86 (i947), Justice Frankfurter set forth a
classification of the cases in which the federal courts have issued writs of habeas corpus. He
placed the Rowland, Ayers, and Sawyer cases in a category headed "Due regard for harmonious
Nation-State relations, need to avoid friction and maintain balance." Justice Frankfurter
then made this additional comment with respect to these cases: "Availability of other remedies
is here an important factor."
For decisions illustrating the history of the development of appellate review of criminal
contempt proceedings, see Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402 (I917);
Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324 (19o3); In re Chetwood, I65 U.S. 443 (1896).
44 The rule that a writ of habeas corpus cannot be used as a writ of review, but can be used
only to release persons held under orders void because made without jurisdiction, has been
substantially modified in the modem decisions. Compare Ex parte Fisk, 113 U.S. 713 (1884),
and Ex parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. (U.S.) 37 (1822), with Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. i9 (z938),
and Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378 (i918).
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question whether an order should be obeyed pendente lite is not one
that should be decided merely by reference to whether the court issuing
the order had jurisdiction.
Another line of decisions in the federal courts appears relevant to the
problem now under discussion. The section of the Judicial Code that
gives to the federal courts original jurisdiction of suits of a civil nature
arising between citizens of different states where $3,000 or more is in controversy imposes limitations truly jurisdictional in character. It might
therefore be supposed that an erroneous conclusion either on the question
of diversity of citizenship or on the existence of the jurisdictional amount
would make any order based on that error void. Despite the seeming logic
of this supposition, the fact is that the federal courts have been not at all
inclined to press the doctrine of the void order to this conclusion.
One passage in the opinion of the Court in In re Sawyer bears directly
on this aspect of the problem of jurisdiction:
We do not rest our conclusion in this case, in any degree, upon the ground, suggested
in argument, that the bill does not show a matter in controversy of sufficient pecuniary
value to support the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court; because an apparent defect of its
jurisdiction in this respect, as in that of citizenship of parties, depending upon an inquiry into facts which might or might not support the jurisdiction, can be availed of
only by appeal or writ of error, and does not render its judgment or decree a nullity.43
The Court is here speaking of questions of diversity of citizenship and the
statutory requirement of $3,ooo-questions that in the case of a federal
court are basically and truly jurisdictional in character. Yet the Court
said that if the decision of these questions depended upon a preliminary
determination of issues of fact, an erroneous decision on the basic question
of jurisdiction would not make the order of the lower court void. Presumably, although the Court is not explicit on this point, in such a case the
litigant would be required to obey a restraining order or injunction until
it was set aside on appeal. The notion embodied in this passage in the
Court's opinion has been described as the doctrine of "jurisdiction to de6
termine jurisdiction.114
The above quotation from the opinion in It re Sawyer is apparently the
first statement of this notion in a decision of the Supreme Court that
was directed to the issue of whether a restraining order should be obeyed
until reversed or set aside in regular course. But the doctrine had an earlier
and respectable history in the decisions of the federal courts dealing with
other questions, particularly those of res judicata and collateral attack.
45In
46 See

re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 220-21 (188 7).
Res Judicata and Jurisdiction: The Bootstrap Doctrine, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 652 (r940).
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The federal courts at an early date held that a decree in a former suit
could not be attacked collaterally on the ground that the court had no
jurisdiction because there was no diversity of citizenship. This rule, which
was first applied in instances in which the record did not show diversity of
citizenship, was subsequently extended to situations in which it affirmatively appeared from the record of the prior proceeding that there was no
diversity of citizenship and hence no jurisdiction. In these decisions the
federal courts took the position that the court in the prior proceeding had
jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction and that the exercise of that
authority protected the decree of the court against collateral attack4 The
subsequent history of this doctrine in the field of res judicata will be considered later in this article.
The theory that a jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction exists to support a restraining order, even though the order is subsequently determined to have been made without jurisdiction, seems never to have been
applied by the Supreme Court in a case involving the duty to obey an invalid restraining order prior to the decision in United States v. United
Mine Workers. 4 But the doctrine had been previously applied by the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in a case raising the issue of
whether such a duty existed. In Carterv. United States,49 the circuit court,
47 Des Moines Navigatidn & R. Co. v. Iowa Homestead Co., 123 U.S. 552, 557-59 (1887).
But cf. Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348 (1920). In the early cases,
such as McCormick v. Sullivant, io Wheat. (U.S.) 192 (1825), the Court did not articulate the
idea of "jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction." But some of the subsequent cases, such as
Des Moines Navigation & R. Co. v. Iowa Homestead Co., 123 U.S. 552, 559 (1887), enunciated
this doctrine: "To determine whether the suit was removable in whole or in part or not, was
certainly within the power of the Circuit Court. The decision of that question was the exercise and the rightful exercise of jurisdiction, no matter whether in favor of or against taking
the cause." Compare Grignon's Lessee v. Astor, 2 How. (U.S.) 319, 339 (i844).
48 330 U.S. 258 (r947). In view of this decision, it is pointless to speculate on the inferences
'which might be drawn from the fact that the Supreme Court did not refer to this doctrine on
occasions when its discussion might have been pertinent, as in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
S16 (1945). There was no suggestion in any of the earlier cases which have been discussed in
this article (In re Sawyer, Ex parte Rowland, and In re Ayers) that a void order was entitled
to obedience pendente lite simply because the lower court had jurisdiction to determine its
own jurisdiction.
49 135 F. 2d 858 (C.C.A. 5th, 1943). In addition, the doctrine, or something very much like
it, was expounded in Passmore Williamson's Case, 26 Pa. 9 (1855), by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. In that case Williamson, who had been sentenced for criminal contempt by a
federal court, petitioned the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus. Williamson's contempt citation had been based on his failure to make an adequate return to a writ
of habeas corpus issued by the federal court. In applying to the Pennsylvania Court, Williamson argued that the federal court had no jurisdiction to entertain the habeas corpus proceeding
and that his commitment for contempt was accordingly void. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania rejected this argument and refused to issue the writ. Writing for the Court, Judge
Jeremiah Black said: "But certainly the want of jurisdiction alleged in this case would not
even have been a defence on the trial. The proposition that a court is powerless to punish for
disorderly conduct or disobedience of its process in a case, which it ought ultimately to dismiss
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with Judge Hutcheson dissenting, reviewing the earlier cases, including In
re Sawyer and In re Fisk, distinguished them or dismissed them as not applicable, applied the doctrine of "jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction"
as developed in the decisions dealing with res judicata and collateral attack, and held that a litigant was bound to obey a temporary restraining order-even though the order was made by a federal court that did
not have jurisdiction of the subject matter of the litigation.5"
The statement that the Supreme Court had never applied this doctrine
of jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction in a case involving the validity of
a restraining order does not disregard the decision in United States v.
Shipp.sr In that case Johnson had been tried, convicted and sentenced to
death by a court of the state of Tennessee. He petitioned a United States
circuit court for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that in the course
of trial he had been deprived of his rights under the federal Constitution.
The circuit court denied the writ and Johnson appealed to the Supreme
Court, which allowed the appeal. Pending the appeal, the Supreme Court
issued an order staying all proceedings against Johnson and directing
Shipp, who was sheriff of a county in Tennessee, to retain custody of
for want of jurisdiction, is not only unsupported by judicial authority, but we think it is new
even as an argument at the bar. We ourselves have heard many cases through and through
before we became convinced that it was our duty to remit the parties to another tribunal.
But we never thought our process could be defied in such cases more than in others.
"There are some proceedings in which the want of jurisdiction would be seen at the first
blush; but there are others in which the court must inquire into all the facts before it can
possibly know whether it has jurisdiction or not. Any one who obstructs or baffles a judicial
investigation for that purpose is unquestionably guilty of a crime for which he may and
ought to be tried, convicted, and punished. Suppose a local action to be brought in the wrong
county; this is a defence to the action, but a defence which must be made out like any other.
While it is pending, neither a party, nor an officer, nor any other person can safely insult the
court, or resist its order. The court may not have power to decide upon the merits of the
case; but it has undoubted power to try whether the wrong was done within its jurisdiction
or not." Ibid., at 21.
so One interesting question that arises with respect to the doctrine of jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction is whether the theory supports the validity of an order only during the
period in which the court of first instance is making up its mind on the question of jurisdiction,
or whether the validity of the order is supported until it is reviewed by the highest appellate court to which resort may be had. Judge Hutcheson, dissenting in Carter v. United States
135 F. 2d 858, 863 (C.C.A. 5th, 1943), seems to have believed that the majority regarded the
validity of the order as temporary only, so that the majority would not have upheld a conviction for contempt of a permanent injunction. However, the majority decision was not
explicit on this point. The idea that validity of the order continues only so long as the court of
first instance makes up its mind on the question of jurisdiction is not consistent with statements in the majority opinion in the Mine Workers case. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 293 (1947). Cases involving the res judicata problem do not present this
particular point. There the jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction is regarded as supporting the
permanent validity of the order or judgment in the sense of making it binding upon the parties
so that it is not subject to collateral attack.
S 203 U.S. 563 (19o6).
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Johnson. Johnson was thereafter taken from jail and lynched. Shipp, together with others, was charged with contempt of the Supreme Court.
Shipp denied the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to punish for contempt
on the ground that the constitutional questions raised by Johnson in support of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus were frivolous and that accordingly neither the circuit court nor the Supreme Court had jurisdiction
of the cause. The Supreme Court rejected this contention.
The decision in the Shipp case can hardly be regarded as an unqualified application of the doctrine of jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction. To the extent that it embodies or applies that notion at all, it
deals with a special kind of jurisdiction. In that case the order that
was vindicated was not an order made by the lower federal court but an
order made by the Supreme Court in aid of its own appellate jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court held, in effect, that it had appellate jurisdiction regardless of the question of the jurisdiction of the lower court, and that,
therefore, the order that it had made in aid of its own jurisdiction was not
void. 2 The conclusion that the Supreme Court had appellate jurisdiction
regardless of the jurisdiction of the lower court was consistent with des3
cisions of the Supreme Court both before and after In re Shipp.
One other aspect of In re Shipp deserves comment. Doubtless the petitioners in the Shipp case had violated that part of the order of the Supreme Court that directed "that... custody of said appellant be retained pending this appeal." But the gravamen of the charge against Shipp
and the other petitioners was not merely that Shipp had failed to retain
custody of the prisoner, but that Shipp and the others had conspired to
destroy Johnson so that the appellate power of the Supreme Court was
rendered wholly nugatory. It seems quite possible that even in the absence
54
of the order petitioners could have been punished for contempt of court.
52 In its brief on the preliminary questions of law in the Shipp case, the United States
argued that even if the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to issue the writ of habeas
corpus the Supreme Court nevertheless had jurisdiction to entertain and act upon the appeal,
citing Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (i886).
53 In the United States v. Corrick, 298 U.S. 435, 440 (1936), the Court declared: "While
the District Court lacked jurisdiction, we have jurisdiction on appeal, not of the merits but
merely for the purpose of correcting the error of the lower court in entertaining the suit."
See Mansfield, Coldwater, &Lake Michigan Ry. Co. v. Swan, 'IIU.S. 379 (1884); Stickney v.
Wilt, 23 Wall. (U.S.) I5O, 163 (1874).
S4 Compare Merrimack River Savings Bank v. Clay Center, 219 U.S. 527, 535-36 (I9ii).
In that case the question for decision was whether a litigant who had destroyed electric light
poles could be punished by the Supreme Court for contempt. The Supreme Court had not
issued an order directing the litigant to preserve the poles, but such an order had been issued
by the lower court. It was argued that any contempt committed must have been contempt of
the lower court order, and not one which could be punished by the Supreme Court. The Court
rejected this contention, stating: "[Irrespective of any such injunction actually issued the
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The destruction of the subject matter of litigation is a direct, violent and
irrevocable interference with the judicial process. It would not be unreasonable to say that the criminality of that kind of contempt does not
depend upon the existence of a court order forbidding the destruction."s
Enough has now been said about the earlier decisions to provide a background for comment on the decision in United States v. United Mine Workers. That decision has been the subject of so much discussion s6 that it
should be unnecessary either to review the facts or to summarize in detail
the opinions that were delivered by the different members of the Supreme
Court.
One of the fundamental issues in the case was whether the restraining
order and the temporary injunction, which the union and its president
were charged with disobeying, had been issued in violation of the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.57 It seems appropriate to begin the
discussion of the case by considering whether the limitations imposed upon
the courts by the Norris-LaGuardia Act are truly jurisdictional in the
sense that an order issued in disregard of the limitations should be regarded as void.
The Norris-LaGuardia Act does not deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction over cases involving labor disputes. It does not deprive the federal
courts of power to issue injunctions in cases involving labor disputes.
Speaking generally, the effect of the statute may be described in the following terms: In any case in which the statute applies, two consequences
follow: i)The federal courts are forbidden to grant injunctions that restrain the commission of certain specified acts.s ' 2) The courts are forbidden to grant injunctions except in compliance with certain procedural rewillful removal beyond the reach of the court of the subject-matter of the litigation or its
destruction pending an appeal from a decree praying, among other things, an injunction to
prevent such removal or destruction until the right shall be determined, is, in and of itself, a
contempt of the appellate jurisdiction of this court."
ssJustice Holmes, both in his opinion in the Shipp case and in his subsequent opinion in
Jones v. Springer, 226 U.S. 148, iS5-56 (1912), referred to the authority exercised in the
Shipp case as a power arising "from the necessity of the case," and one whose exercise was
necessary "to preserve" the subject matter of the litigation.
s6 Watt, The Divine Right of Government by Judiciary, 14 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 409 (1947);
see also 47 Col. L. Rev. 5o5 (i947); 6o Harv. L. Rev. 811 (i947); 42 Ill. L. Rev. 372 (1947);
45 Mich. L. Rev. 469 (1947); 22 N.Y.U. L.Q. Rev. 337 (i947); 33 Va. L. Rev. 266 (1947);
19 Tenn. L. Rev. 988 (i947); and 15 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 497 (947), all noting the Mine
Workers case.
5747 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. § 101 (1947).
8 7 Stat. 470 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. § 104 (947).
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quirements with respect to the taking of evidence in open court, notice
and the making of appropriate findings of fact, etc.5 9
In a number of cases arising before the Mine Workers case, the Supreme
Court referred to the Norris-LaGuardia Act as a statute intended to limit
and to restrict the exercise of the equitable powers of the federal courts."
In Yakus v. United States" Chief justice Stone, writing for the majority
'of the Court, listed the Norris-LaGuardia Act, together with a number of
other statutes that limit the power of the federal courts to issue injunctions, and described these statutes as "the legislative formulation of what
would otherwise be a rule of judicial discretion .. .,6 These are hardly
apt words to describe a statute believed to control jurisdiction in the basic
or primary sense.
It has already been pointed out 6 3 that the decisions of the Supreme
Court dealing with the concept of equity jurisdiction support the conclusion that questions about the existence of equity jurisdiction are not the
kind of jurisdictional questions that, if erroneously decided, make a judicial order void. If this is true of the existence of equity jurisdiction, why
should it not be equally true of questions that arise with respect to limitations on the exercise of equitable jurisdiction once it is found to exist?
These considerations suggest that had the Supreme Court chosen to do
5947 Stat. 7F (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. § 109 (1947).

60The Norris-LaGuardia Act was styled "An Act to Amend the Judicial Code and to
define and limit the jurisdiction of Courts sitting in equity." See particularly Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen v. Toledo, Peoria & Western R.R., 321 U.S. 50, 58 (z944); United States
v. Hutcheson,. 312 U.S. 219, 231 (194); Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley
Farm Products Co., 3xi U.S. 91,

1o

(i94o),

in all of which the Supreme Court

insisted that the limitations placed upon the Court were severe and should be given great
weight in determining congressional policy toward the exercise of judicial power in labor
controversies. Yet in all these cases the Court seemed to speak in terms of a limitation upon
the exercise of equity jurisdiction. Thus, in the Railroad Trainmen case the Court said of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act: "The latter did not entirely abolish judicial power to impose previous
restraint in labor controversies. But its prime purpose was to restrict the federal equity power
in such matters within greatly narrower limits than it had come to occupy."
6z 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
6In
the case of at least two of the statutes listed by Chief Justice Stone in this passage,
the Supreme Court has held that the limitation imposed is not jurisdictional in character.
Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W. I. Southern, Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 570 (1939), dealt with the provisions
of 28 U.S.C.A. § 384 (X928) that suits in equity shall not be sustained in the courts of the
United States where plain, complete, and adequate remedy may be had at law; Smith v.
Apple, 264 U.S. 274, 278-79 (1924) construed 28 U.S.C.A. § 379 (1928), which prohibits the
federal courts from issuing injunctions staying proceedings in a state court. Two points, however, should be noted about those statutes and the cases cited: i) Although the prohibition
contained in the statutes was unequivocal, neither statute used the word "jurisdiction."
2) The statements were not made with respect to the question of whether a restraining order
made in violation of the statutes would be void.
63 See text at notes 33-35 supra, and cases cited therein.
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so, it might properly have rested its decision in the Mine Workers case on
the ground that the Norris-LaGuardia Act is not an act affecting the basic
jurisdiction of the courts; that, at most, it merely limits the exercise of
equitable jurisdiction, and that the questions that arise with respect to
its application are not the kind of jurisdictional questions that, if errone64
ously decided, make an order void.

At least two objections might be made to this suggestion. In the first
place, it might be said that the statute itself speaks in terms of jurisdiction
-that the important prohibitory sections of the statute begin: "No Court
of the United States shall have jurisdiction ...

."

Because of this explicit

command, it could be argued that the Court was bound to decide that infirmities caused by disregard of the statute were truly jurisdictional in
character.
But the use of the word "jurisdiction" in the statute hardly seems conclusive. In Burnet v. Desmornes6 Justice Holmes pointed out that words of
a statute that "might seem to affect the power of the court" may merely
"fix the law by which the court should decide." In any event, the word
"jurisdiction" is used in the Norris-LaGuardia Act in a context that
shows that the word refers to "equity jurisdiction." Accordingly, even if
the word is given full weight, its use does not require the conclusion that
a restraining order or preliminary injunction issued in disregard of the
Act's requirements is void, because *thebetter view would seem to be, as
pointed out above, that even total absence of equity jurisdiction does not
make a judicial order void.
In the second place, it may be argued that, apart from the use of the
word "jurisdiction" in the statute, the prohibitions of the Norris-La
Guardia Act are so explicit and unqualified that it is obvious that Congress
intended any restraining order or preliminary injunction issued in disregard of those prohibitions to be void. But the fact that the command of
the statute is explicit and unqualified is not in itself conclusive of the point
now under consideration. Apart from the use of the word "jurisdiction,"
the prohibitions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act are no more explicit than
those of Section 265 of the Judicial Code,66 which provide that the writ
6

4In three states courts have construed state statutes similar to the Norris-LaGuardia
Act as imposing limitations not strictly jurisdictional in character. Main Cleaners & Dyers,
Inc. v. Columbia Super Cleaners, Inc., 332 Pa. 71, 2 A. 2d 750 (1938); Reid v. Independent
Union of All Workers, 200 Minn. 599, 275 N.W. 300 (1937); State ex rel. Hopkins v. Howat,
109 Kan. 376, 383-84, i98 Pac. 686, 69o (1921). For a contrary view of the New York antiinjunction statute, see People ex rel. Sandnes v. Sheriff of Kings County, 164 N.Y. Misc. 355,
299 N.Y. Supp. 9 (z937).
6S226 U.S. 145, 147 (1912); see Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 234-35 (1908).
6 36 Stat. 1162 (1911), 28 U.S.C.A. § 379 (1928).
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of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the United States to
stay proceedings in any court of a state except where the injunction may
be authorized by any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy; or than
the provisions of Section 277 of the Judicial Code,6 7 which forbid the courts
of the United States to entertain any suit in equity if there is a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law; or than the provisions of the Act of
October 15, 1914,6" which state flatly that every injunction and restraining
order shall set forth the reasons for its issuance. The Supreme Court has
held in the case of each of these statutes that the limitations it imposes are
69
not jurisdictional in character.
Whatever merit may exist in the view of the statute just suggested, it is
fairly clear that the view was not adopted by the Supreme Court in the
Mine Workers case. True enough, there are passages in the opinion of
Chief Justice Vinson that suggest the district court had jurisdiction
even if the Norris-LaGuardia Act applied. For example, the Chief Justice
said: "[W]e find impressive authority for the proposition that an order issued by a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter and person must
be obeyed by the parties until it is reversed by orderly and proper proceedings. ' ' 7° In addition, he continued, "We insist upon the same duty of
obedience where, as here, the subject matter of the suit, as well as the
parties, was properly before the court; where the elements of federal jurisdiction were clearly shown; and where the authority of the court of first
instance to issue an order ancillary to the main suit depended upon a statute, the scope and applicability of which were subject to substantial
doubt.""7
But other passages inthe Chief Justice's opinion are inconsistent with
the view that no truly jurisdictional question was involved. Thus, Chief
6736 Stat. 1163
68 38

(I9I),

Stat. 738 (1914),

U.S.C.A. § 384 (1928).
U.S.C.A. § 383 (1928).
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69Section 265 of the Judicial Code: Woodmen of the World v. O'Neill, 266 U.S. 292 (1924);
Smith v.Apple, 264 U.S. 274 (1924).
Section 267 of the Judicial Code: Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W. I. Southern, Inc., 306 U.S.
563, 570 (1939) ("[Tjhe issue is not one of jurisdiction but of the need and propriety of equitable
relief.... ."); Di Giovanni v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 296 U.S. 64, 69 (i935).
Act of October 15, 1914: Lawrence v. St. L.-S.F. Ry. Co., 274 U.S. 588, 591-92 (1927);
Druggan v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 36,40 (1925).
70 330 U.S. 258, 293 (i947). In this portion of his opinion the Chief Justice cited Howat v.
Kansas, where the Supreme Court stated that it regarded the injunction as one issued by a
court having jurisdiction both of the person and of the subject matter. This had also been the
view of the Kansas Supreme Court, which had asserted that the lower court had jurisdiction
and that the injunction, although erroneous, was not void. State ex rel. Hopkins v. Howat
o

109 Kan. 376,384, I98 Pac. 686, 69 (1921).
71330 U.S. 258, 294 (1947).
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Justice Vinson qualified the scope of his decision by this assertion: "Although a different result would follow were the question of jurisdiction
frivolous and not substantial such contention would be idle here." 72 This
statement seems to imply that the true issue in the case was one of jurisdiction and not merely whether the court below had improperly issued
an order ancillary to the main suit. In another passage of his opinion, the
Chief Justice, after describing the circumstances in which the district
court issued the restraining order, declared: "In these circumstances, the
District Court unquestionably had the power to issue a restraining order
for the purpose of preserving existing conditions pending a decision upon
its own jurisdiction." 73 In this sentence the Chief Justice appears to be
applying the doctrine of jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction.
If, in fact, the application of the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not raise a
truly jurisdictional question, that is to say, if the district court had jurisdiction of the subject matter notwithstanding any error it may have made
in construing the Norris-LaGuardia Act, then both the non-frivolous character of the issue involved and the notion of jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction would be beside the point. The references to both of these
matters in the opinion of the Chief Justice make it difficult to determine
whether he believed that the issue in the case related to the jurisdiction of
the district court, in the strict sense of the word "jurisdiction," or that
the issue related only to the authority of that court to issue an ancillary
order in a case in which it had jurisdiction.
The opinion of Justice Frankfurter, whose concurrence was necessary to establish a majority of the Court, raises less doubt. It seems
clear that Justice Frankfurter was prepared to hold that in some situations an injunction issued in violation of the provisions of the Norris-La
74
Guardia Act would be void and need not be obeyed pendente lite. Justice Frankfurter appears to have reached the conclusion that the defendants were bound to obey the temporary restraining order and the preliminary injunction by the following reasoning: The question whether the
Norris-LaGuardia Act applied to the dispute between the defendants and
the United States raised a "complicated and novel" issue; the district
court had power to decide whether the case was properly before it, and
721bid., at

293.

7

Ibid., at 29o.

74 For example, justice Frankfurter said, "Thus, the explicit withdrawal from federal
district courts of the power to issue injunctions in an ordinary labor dispute between a private
employer and his employees cannot be defeated, and an existing right to strike thereby impaired, by pretending to entertain a suit for such an injunction in order to decide whether the
court has jurisdiction. In such a case, a judge would not be acting as a court. He would be a
pretender to, not a wielder of, judicial power." Ibid., at 3io.
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therefore it could make appropriate orders "to afford the necessary time
for fair consideration and decision while existing conditions were preserved.... To say that the authority of the Court may be flouted during
the time necessary to decide is to reject the requirements of the judicial
process."75 In his opinion Justice Frankfurter discussed at greater length
than did the Chief Justice the non-frivolous character of the issue which
had been raised with respect to the authority of the district court.
This is an appropriate point to comment briefly on the importance attached by the majority of the Court in the Mine Workers case to the conclusion that the assertion of authority by the district court was not frivolous. Little in the oldeg decisions of the Supreme Court suggests that
the question of the duty to obey pendente lite an invalid restraining order
turns on whether the assertion of jurisdiction is frivolous. Certainly the
questions involved in In re Sawyer, In re Ayers, and Ex parte Fisk were
substantial questions. Yet the Court did not hesitate to conclude in those
cases that the litigants were entitled to disobey the restraining orders with
impunity because those orders were made without jurisdiction and were
76
therefore void.
The theory that the non-frivolous character of the assertion of jurisdiction is relevent to the issue of whether a restraining order must be obeyed
pendente lite seems first to have been advanced in two decisions of the

77
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Locke v. United States '

and Carterv. United States.75 In the first of these cases, the Ldcke case, the
circuit court, in suggesting that a restraining order should be obeyed
pendente lite if the assertion of authority was not frivolous, quoted with
approval the following passage from the opinion of the Supreme Court in
Binderup v. Path6Exchange:79" Jurisdiction, as distinguished from merits,
is wanting only where the claim set forth in the complaint is so unsubstantial as to be frivolous or, in other words, is plainly without color of
merit." This statement was made by the Supreme Court in the Binderup
case in the course of deciding that a judgment of a district court that
7s Ibid., at 3io-1i. Compare the remarks of Judge Jeremiah Black in Passmore Williamson's Case, 26 Pa. 9, 21 (i855), quoted in note 49 supra.
76 As pointed out in the text at note 47 supra, the doctrine of jurisdiction to determine
jurisdiction seems first to have been developed in cases where the ultimate question was one
of res judicata or collateral attack. The issue in those cases always related to the finality of a
judgment alleged to be void for want of jurisdiction. It is hardly to be expected that those
cases would suggest that the existence of the jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction was dependent upon, or related in any way to, the question whether the assertion of jurisdiction
was frivolous.
77 75 F. 2d 157 (C.C.A. 5th, i935).
78135 F. 2d 858 (C.C.A. 5th, 1943).

79 263 U.S. 291, 305-6 (1923).
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dismissed a pleading, on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action under the Sherman Act, was not a judgment
touching the jurisdiction of the district court. 8° The statement was not
made with reference to whether a litigant is bound to obey pendente lite
a restraining order issued without jurisdiction, and it is doubtful whether
this statement (or similar statements made in opinions of the Supreme
Court dealing with issues like the issue raised in the Binderup case) gives
any substantial support to the notion that a restraining order made without jurisdiction should be obeyed merely because the assertion of jurisdiction is not frivolous.8'
Whatever may be said about the historical basis of the doctrine of the
non-frivolous order, the decision in the Mine Workers case has given that
doctrine a stature that it has not heretofore possessed. Henceforth, a
litigant who wishes to disregard a temporary restraining order must be
sure not only that the order was made without jurisdiction but also that
the assertion of jurisdiction is frivolous. It is difficult to say what degree of
frivolity will be required before the order made without jurisdiction may
safely be disregarded. The fact that Chief Justice Vinson cited with approval the decision in Carter v. United States,82 is not reassuring on this
point. There the jurisdiction of the federal court was invoked on the
ground that the Norris-LaGuardia Act conferred upon the federal courts
jurisdiction of any controversy involving a labor dispute irrespective of
the existence of diversity of citizenship or of any other ground of federal
SoAfter the plaintiff's opening statement to the jury the district court had instructed the
jury to return a verdict for the defendants on the ground that the pleadings and the opening

statement, taken together, did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action under
the Sherman Act. After the circuit court affirmed the judgment, the plaintiff sought a writ
of error in the Supreme Court. In the Supreme Court the defendants moved to dismiss the
writ of error, alleging that Section 238 of the Judicial Code required writs of error to be taken
directly to the Supreme Court in any case in which the jurisdiction of the district court was in
issue. The Supreme Court refused to dismiss the writ of error, holding that the district court's
decision had to do with the merits of the case and not with that court's jurisdiction.
8

1 Statements somewhat similar to that in the Binderup case may be found in Hart v.
262 U.S. 271, 273 (1923); Swafford v. Templeton, i85 U.S.
487, 493-94 (1902). Another line of cases discusses the relationship between the substance of a
claim and the existence of jurisdiction. These cases deal with the problem of whether writ of
error or certiorari is the proper method for Supreme Court review of state court decisions
which allegedly raise federal questions. Zucht v. King, 26o U.S. 174, X76 (1922); United States
Fidelity & Guaranty v. Oklahoma, 250 U.S. iii, 112 (I919); Ennis Water Works v. Ennis,
233 US. 652, 658 (I914); Deming v. Carlisle Packing Co., 226 U.S. 102 (i912); Equitable Life
Assurance Society v. Brown, 187 U.S. 308 (i9o2); New Orleans Water Works Co. v. Louisiana,
i85 U.S. 336 (1902). It would be impossible adequately to discuss this line of cases within the
compass of this article. It is enough to say that they turn on considerations that seem irrelevant to the problem now being considered.

B. F. Keith Vaudeville Exchange,

82 x35 F. 2d 858 (C.C.A. Sth, 1943).
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jurisdiction.5 3 It is difficult to think of an assertion of jurisdiction more
lacking in substance.
The decision in the Mine Workers case, read against the background of
the earlier decisions, raises the question whether the time has come, at
least so far as concerns jurisdiction of subject matter, to discard the distinction between orders void because made without jurisdiction and merely erroneous orders, and to adopt instead a different test to determine
whether an erroneous order should be obeyed pendente lite. This suggestion is restricted to jurisdiction of the subject matter for two reasons (although there may be others of equal weight):
i. Although the existence of jurisdiction over the person is sometimes a
difficult question, in general the concept of jurisdiction of the person is
more certain in its outline and content and easier of application to particular situations than is the concept of jurisdiction of subject matter.
2. The relationship between jurisdiction and the duty to obey seems
more direct in the case of an order made without jurisdiction of the person
than it is in the case of an order made without jurisdiction of the subject
matter. The remark of justice Holmes that"the foundation of jurisdiction
is physical power"' 4 applies to jurisdiction over the person in a sense in
which it does not apply to jurisdiction of the subject matter. It appears
not unreasonable to say that an order made by a court that has no physical power over the litigant is an order that need not be obeyed. Certain
practical considerations may apply when a court lacks jurisdiction of the
person that may not be present if the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter: An order made without jurisdiction of the person may be an
order made without notice to the litigant or issued in circumstances in
which it is difficult, or impossible, for the litigant to contest the order. Attempts to contest the validity of orders made without jurisdiction of the
person sometimes raise questions of consent and waiver that are not
raised by attempts to contest jurisdiction over the subject matter8s
The suggestion that the existence of jurisdiction of the subject matter
should be discarded as a test of the duty of the litigant to obey an invalid
order is not intended to lead to the conclusion that the litigant should
obey, pendente lite, every invalid restraining order, no matter what its
character or effect may be, made by a court having jurisdiction of the litigant's person. There will be cases in which the litigant should be free to
disregard an invalid restraining order. But the circumstances that should
83But see Brown v. Coumanis, 135 F. 2d 163 (C.C.A. 5th, x943).
84 McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917).

8 See Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32 (1938).-
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III

be regarded as justifying that disobedience have no necessary relevance to
the distinction between orders void because made without jurisdiction of
the subject matter and orders that are merely erroneous.
In determining whether a litigant should be required to obey, pendente
lite, a restraining order or temporary injunction that the litigant believes
is invalid because the court issuing it did not have jurisdiction of the subject matter, two points are of substantial importance:
i. As long as the litigant has an adequate opportunity to seek appellate
review of the order's validity in the normal way, there seems to be no reason to permit him to resort to disobedience as a means of testing the order's
validity.86 It seems reasonable, therefore, to say that unless the litigant
has exhausted his opportunities (by the prompt filing of an appeal and by
the application for stays, pending appeal) to have the order reviewed in
the usual way, he has no standing to insist upon testing the order's validity by disobedience.8 7 Situations may arise, however, in which there is no
right of appeal. For example, there is serious doubt whether the provisions
of the Judicial Code permit an appeal to a circuit court of appeals from an
order of a district court granting a temporary restraining order as distinguished from a preliminary injunction.88
86 In the Mine Workers case the defendants made no attempt to obtain appellate review of
the temporary restraining order. They did not move to vacate that order. The first motion
which the defendants made in the case was a motion made on November 26, 1946 to discharge
and to vacate the rule which had previously issued requiring them to show cause why they
should not be punished for contempt. Apparently, however, their counsel had appeared on the
previous day, pursuant to the order to show cause, and denied the jurisdiction of the court.
87 The courts would probably be reluctant to punish alitigant for the violation of a restraining order or a temporary injunction committed while the litigant, in good faith and with due
diligence, was trying to get a stay. See Salmon River Canal Co. v. District Court, 38 Idaho
377, 387-88, 221 Pac. 135, 139 (1923).
88 Decisions on this point under Section 129 of the Judicial Code, 36 Stat. 1134 (I9x),
28 U.S.C.A. § 227 (i94o), present conflicting views. Pack v. Carter, 223 Fed. 638 (C.C.A. 9th,
1915); Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Chicago & Alton R. Co.,

192

Fed. 517 (C.C.A.

7 th, 2912);

Taylor v. Breese, 163 Fed. 678 (C.C.A. 4 th, igo8). The prevailing opinion seems to be, however,
that no appeal can be taken under this section of the Judicial Code from the granting of a temporary restraining order, because the order is merely incidental to the proceedings that may
lead to a preliminary injunction. Schainmann v. Brainard, 8 F. 2d 11, 22 (C.C.A. 9th, 1925).
Compare Section io of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 4 7 stat. 72 (2932), 29 U.S.C.A. § 220 (1947),
which provides for prompt appeals from orders granting temporary injunctions, but presumably does not apply to the granting of temporary restraining orders.
But if there is a hearing on a notice to vacate or to dissolve a temporary restraining order
and the order is continued, it can be persuasively argued that an appeal will lie. See Schainmann v. Brainard, 8 F. 2d 2i (C.C.A. 9th, 2925); Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
317 U.S. i88, 192 (1942), in which the Supreme Court stated, "The relief afforded by Section
129 is not restricted by the terminology used. The statute looks to the substantial effect of the
order made."
Thus, in the Mine Workers case, if the union had moved to dissolve the temporary restraining order, and if there had been a hearing resulting in an adverse decision denying the
motion and continuing the order, the union might have been able to appeal.

112

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

It may well be, therefore, that circumstances may exist in which a
litigant, either because he has no right of appeal or because he has not been
able to obtain a stay pending appeal, is faced with a choice between immediate obedience to a restraining order that he believes to be invalid or
defiance of the order. In those situations, the second consideration comes
into play.
2. The second consideration deals with the effect that obedience will
have upon the litigant's position and rights. If the temporary restraining
order or the preliminary injunction in effect decides the only question involved in litigation and thus really disposes of the merits of the case, it is
the kind of order that a litigant should not be compelled to obey pending
its review. 89
On the other hand, if the order injures or affects the litigant only in an
abstract or theoretical sense, then no matter how erroneous or improper
it may be, there is no good reason for the litigant not to obey the order
while the order is being reviewed in the usual way. Thus, if an order prohibits the commission of certain acts by the litigant and the postponement
of the commission of those acts pending review will not, in fact, seriously
prejudice the litigant, the rule suggested would require the litigant to obey
even though his rights, considered in the abstract, may be infringed by
the order and even though he may be to some extent inconvenienced.90
In instances in which the order requires the litigant to take affirmative
action, the question to be decided is whether the affirmative action will,
in fact, irrevocably injure or prejudice the litigant's rights. The possibility of making this showing will always presumably be greater in the case of
an affirmative order than it will be in the case of an order that is merely
prohibitory. But even in the case of the affirmative order, there may well
be instances in which the action required can be recalled or undone after
89Compare the state court decisions holding that a preliminary injunction that divests
rights or attempts to transfer the possession of property is not only erroneous but void. State
ex rel. Reynolds v. Graves, 66 Neb. 17, 21, 92 N.W. i44, 145 (1902); Tawas & Bay County
R.R. v. Circuit Judge, 44 Mich. 479, 482, 7 N.W. 65, 66 (188o); cf.-Weaver v. Toney, 107 Ky.
419, 54 S.W. 732 (x899); People ex rel. Port Huron & Gratiot Ry. Co. v. Judge of St. Clair
Circuit, 31 Mich. 456 (1875).
The holding in these cases that the orders were void seems difficult to defend. In each case
the court appears to have had jurisdiction both of the person and of the subject matter. The
decisions, however, illustrate the reluctance of the courts to enforce obedience to an invalid
order if obedience will inflict serious and irrevocable injury upon the litigant.
90 Compare the comment in 2 High, Injunctions § 1425 (4th ed., 19o5): "The practice,
however, of thus disregarding the solemn mandate of the court, although it be void, is not to
be encouraged and, except in cases where serious injury might otherwise result, the aggrieved
party would better resort to the more orderly method either of applying to the court for a
dissolution of the injunction or of seeking relief by appeal.'!
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the invalidity of the order has been established, without real prejudice to
the litigant. 9r
Thus, if the injury that will be inflicted upon the litigant's interest by
compliance with the order believed to be invalid will be substantial and
irreparable, then and only then should disobedience of the order be immune from punishment in the event that the litigant ultimately establishes
the invalidity of the order.
In short, I suggest that the general rule should be that it is the duty of
the litigant to obey all orders made by a court having jurisdiction of his
person, pendente lite, regardless of the decision that is made with respect
to the ultimate validity of those orders, with this exception: If the litigant
has exhausted all the normal methods of appellate review and if obedience to the order will substantially and irrevocably injure legal interests
of the litigant that are not remote and abstract in character, then the
litigant should be entitled to take his chance on the invalidity of the order.
If he prevails in his attack upon its validity, he should be immune from
punishment for contempt. This rule should be applied in those cases in
which the temporary order is merely erroneous as well as those cases in
which it is asserted to have been made without jurisdiction. The fact that
under the traditional rule a litigant, who is prohibited from taking action
or required to take action by an order that is merely erroneous and not
void because without jurisdiction, has no remedy even though he has no
opportunity for appellate review, is an anomaly that should be removed
from the law. As indicated earlier in this article, the unfairness of this result may well have induced the Supreme Court in some cases in the past to
treat infirmities as jurisdictional when strictly they should not have been
so regarded.
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In conclusion, it will be helpful to refer briefly to arguments that may
be made for and against the proposal advanced:
In support of the proposal, it can be said that, in general, public policy
looks with favor upon the principle that litigants should comply with orders issued by the courts until those orders are reversed or set aside by
normal appellate procedures. If there are to be exceptions to that public
policy, the exceptions should be stated in terms that are, as far as possible,
free from ambiguity and that have some relevance to the practical con9xI venture to think that this was the situation in the MineWorkers case. In all probability
the union would not have been seriously prejudiced if the notice of termination of the contract
had been suspended pending determination of the right to terminate the contract, assuming,

of course, as I think it is proper to assume, that speedy review of that question would have been
possible.
92See text at notes 43-44 supra; see also note 89 supra.
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siderations that may justify disobedience in particular situations. The concept of jurisdiction of the subject matter is so elusive and has been treated
with so much inconsistency by the courts that it is both unsatisfactory
and difficult of application to particular situations if used as a test of the
duty to obey. It is not a test having any necessary relevance to the reasons
that may justify disobedience in particular situations.
It may be objected, .however, that the two considerations that have
been suggested as tests of the right to disobey an invalid order are just
as vague and unsatisfactory as absence of jurisdiction of the subject
matter. But the question of whether the litigant has exhausted his normal
appellate remedies is one that can usually be determined without difficulty. A judgment about the effect which oledience to the order will
have upon the litigant's rights may be difficult in particular situations.
But surely it is less difficult to make this decision than it is to decide (i)
whether the court issuing the order had jurisdiction of the subject matter
and (2) whether the assertion of jurisdiction is so irrational that it may be
disregarded as frivolous.
The procedural and substantive peculiarities of a proceeding for criminal contempt and the confusion between civil and criminal contempt
that to some extent still exists make the contempt proceeding an inappropriate device for reviewing the validity of judicial orders. This is an
additional reason for restricting any exception to the general principle that
a litigant must seek review of any erroneous orders by the normal appellate procedure within the narrowest compass consistent with the public
interest.
It may be said that to do away with the distinction between orders void
because made without jurisdiction and those that are merely erroneous
will remove an important restraint on the usurpation of power by the
courts. There is weight in this objection. But if the commands of Congress
and the lessons of the earlier decisions are clear, it may be assumed that
the courts will stay within the limits of their authority. In doubtful cases,
the courts may exceed their authority. If they do so, under the rule suggested, their orders may bave to be obeyed until reversed. But that seems
to be the law under the Mine Workers case. Certainly it would be a rash
litigant today who would conclude that he could safely disregard an order
made in disregard of some statutory limitation on the powers of a federal
court so long as there was any possible ground for argument that the assertion of the authority was not frivolous. As matters now stand, the doc-

trine of the order that is void because made without jurisdiction is rather
an enigma for the litigant than a limitation on the courts.
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In the field of res judicata the courts have largely abandoned the distinction between jurisdictional infirmities, on the one hand, and mere
error, on the other, as a test for determining whether a prior adjudication
is binding. The development of the law in this respect has been the subject of full comment in the law journals and will not be discussed in detail
here. 93 Briefly, however, it may be said that although the federal courts
started with the generalization that an order made without jurisdiction
is void and can be attacked collaterally in any other proceeding, step by
step they have qualified and limited this generalization until it has finally
been held that the doctrine of res judicata applies to questions of jurisdiction as well as to all other questions, and indeed that in some circumstances it applies even when the issue of jurisdiction was not litigated in
the prior proceeding.94
It is true that the doctrine of res judicata rests upon the public interest in maintaining some degree of finality in litigation. It is also
true that the latter consideration is not pertinent to the present discussion. But just as in the field of res judicata the public interest in finality
of litigation led the courts to modify, and in large measure to abandon, the
distinction between jurisdictional infirmities and mere error, so in the
field under discussion the general public interest in vindicating the authority of the courts and in encouraging the orderly conduct of litigation may
well justify judicial reconsideration of the same distinction.
93See particularly Boskey and Braucher, Jurisdiction and Collateral Attack: October
Term, 1939, 40 Col. L. Rev. ioo6 (194o); see also Res Judicata and Jurisdiction: The Bootstrap Doctrine, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 652 (194o); Judgment on Merits as Res Judicata of Jurisdiction over Subject Matter, 49 Yale L.J. 959 (I94O); Rashid, The Full Faith and Credit
Clause: Collateral Attack of Jurisdictional Issues, 36 Geo. L.J. 154 (1948).
94 Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940); Treinies v.
Sunshine Mining Co., 3o8 U.S. 66 (1939); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 3o5 U.S. 165 (1938). But there are
limits beyond which the courts will not go in permitting the doctrine of res judicata to cure
jurisdictional infirmities. See Kalb v. Feuerstein, 3o8 U.S. 433 (194o); United States v. United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 3o9 U.S. 5o6 (i94o); and comment on these decisions in
Boskey and Braucher, op. cit. supra note o3.

